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Abstract—Deep packet inspection via regular expression (RE)
matching is a crucial task of network intrusion detection systems
(IDSes), which secure Internet connection against attacks and
suspicious network traffic. Monitoring high-speed computer net-
works (100 Gbps and faster) in a single-box solution demands that
the RE matching, traditionally based on finite automata (FAs), is
accelerated in hardware. In this paper, we describe a novel FPGA
architecture for RE matching that is able to process network
traffic beyond 100 Gbps. The key idea is to reduce the required
FPGA resources by leveraging approximate nondeterministic FAs
(NFAs). The NFAs are compiled into a multi-stage architecture
starting with the least precise stage with a high throughput and
ending with the most precise stage with a low throughput. To
obtain the reduced NFAs, we propose new approximate reduction
techniques that take into account the profile of the network
traffic. Our experiments showed that using our approach, we
were able to perform matching of large sets of REs from SNORT,
a popular IDS, on unprecedented network speeds.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSes), such as SNORT [1],
SURICATA [2], or BRO [3], are widely used to secure Internet
connection against attacks and malicious traffic. One of the
prominent approaches for IDSes is deep packet inspection
(DPI), which is based on matching regular expressions (REs)
describing attack patterns against network traffic. Despite the
recent rapid increase of encrypted traffic on the Internet, RE-
based DPI is still in high demand since IDSes are often
deployed at network entry points after decryption.
Due to the increasing number of security vulnerabilities
and network attacks, the number of REs in IDSes is con-
stantly growing. At the same time, the speed of networks is
growing too—telecommunication companies started to deploy
100 Gbps links, the 400 Gbps Ethernet standard has recently
been ratified [4], and large data centers already call for
a 1 Tbps technology. Consequently, despite many proposed
optimisations, existing IDSes are still far from being able to
process the traffic in current high-speed networks at the line
speed. The best software-based solution we are aware of is the
one in [5], which can achieve a 100 Gbps throughput using
BRO on a cluster of servers with a well-designed distribution
of network traffic. Processing network traffic at such speeds
in single-box IDSes is far beyond the capabilities of software-
based solutions—hardware acceleration is needed.
A well-suited technology for accelerating IDSes is that of
field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). They provide high
computing power and flexibility for network traffic processing,
and they are increasingly being used in data centers [6], [7]
for this purpose. The flexibility of FPGAs allows them to
match REs at speeds over 100 Gbps [8]. Such high speeds,
however, put excessive demands on the resources of FPGAs.
The sets of the matched REs are complex, large, and still
growing, and matching on the speeds of tens and hundreds of
Gbps requires massive parallelization. For instance, in the HW
architecture that we propose in Section II, processing 100 Gbps
input network traffic requires 64 concurrently functioning RE
matching units (of 8-bit input width operating at 200 MHz) and
processing 400 Gbps requires even 256 units. These demands
easily exceed the size of any available FPGA chip. Reducing
the consumed resources is thus of paramount importance.
The FPGA matching units traditionally implement finite
automata (FAs), either deterministic (DFAs) or nondetermin-
istic (NFAs). In this paper, we focus on NFAs since they are
often much smaller than the corresponding DFAs and can be
efficiently mapped into FPGAs as shown, e.g., by [9]–[13].
The main conceptual difference from other works on ef-
ficient synthesis of NFAs into FPGAs (described in more
detail in the related work section), which allows us to achieve
much higher matching speeds, lies in leveraging reduced NFAs
that over-approximate the language of the original NFA—we
design novel reduction techniques that provide high-quality
tradeoffs between the precision and reduction factors.
Subsequently, in order to utilise the resources of an FPGA in
the best possible way, we propose a multi-stage architecture of
the RE matching engine. Consider an NFA A that recognizes
the language L of a given set of REs. The proposed archi-
tecture is composed of several stages where the first stage
contains many, concurrently running, copies of small NFAs
that crudely over-approximate L, and further stages contain
a smaller number of copies of NFAs that are larger but more
precise. The throughput of the stages decreases: the first stage
needs to be able to process the network traffic at the line speed
while the subsequent stages can handle less. The task of every
stage is to decrease the amount of traffic entering the next stage
by removing some of the packets that are guaranteed not to
be in L. The last stage contains either A, or, in the case of
insufficient FPGA resources, a reduced version of A that over-
approximates L (in which case the final processing step takes
place in software). The NFAs used in the over-approximating
stages need to discard a significant portion of their input from
further processing while keeping all of the suspicious traffic. In
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the worst case, i.e., when every input packet is a member of L,
this is, naturally, impossible. Fortunately, in standard traffic on
a backbone network, only a small portion of the packets is
normally in L (the extreme case when a significant proportion
of network traffic is in L usually corresponds to a DoS attack,
which needs to be handled by other means than IDSes).
Our approximate NFA reduction takes an advantage of
particularities of standard network traffic. Namely, given an
NFA constructed from the REs of interest, we label its
states with their significance—the likelihood that they will
be used during processing a packet—, and then simplify the
least significant parts of the automaton. The simplification
is implemented by pruning and merging of the insignificant
states. The significance of a state is determined using training
traffic, a finite sample of “standard” traffic from the network
node where the IDS is to be deployed (it may be necessary to
generate a new design once in a while). The reduction scales
well—the worst-case time complexity of the most expensive
step, computing the state labelling, is O(n2k) where n is the
number of states of the NFA and k is the size of the training
traffic (since the automata are usually sparse, the quadratic
factor is rarely an issue on real-world examples).
We implemented the proposed approach and evaluated it on
REs taken from the IDS SNORT and other resources. We were
able to obtain a substantial reduction of the size of the NFAs
while keeping the number of false positives low. When used
within the multi-stage architecture, we were able to perform
RE matching at 100 and 400 Gbps on sets of REs whose sizes
were far beyond the capabilities of existing solutions.
The contributions of this paper are the following:
1) We propose a new HW architecture for matching REs
in high-speed computer networks using several stages of
NFAs that over-approximate the matched REs.
2) We developed new scalable over-approximation tech-
niques that take into account the profile of network traffic
and thus provide great reductions of the NFAs while
keeping an acceptable error.
3) We present experimental results proving that our ap-
proach can indeed be successfully used to implement
single-box hardware-accelerated IDSes at speeds of
100 Gbps or even 400 Gbps, which is, taking into account
the size and complexity of the considered REs, far beyond
the capabilities of current solutions.
Related Work
Many different architectures for resource-efficient mapping
of NFAs for fast RE matching into FPGAs have been designed,
starting with the work of Prasana and Sidhu [9]. Later, Clark
and Schimmel [10] reduced hardware resources by using
a shared decoder of input symbols, and the architecture of
Sourdis et al. [11] implements an NFA transition table by
a pre-decoded CAM. Lin et al. [12] introduced an architecture
that allows hardware resources to be shared for matching REs
with the same prefixes, infixes, and suffixes. Furthermore, the
work of Yun and Lee [13] improved the encoding of states
using the so-called at-most-two-hot encoding.
To increase the RE matching speed, some architectures
make the NFAs process multiple bytes of the input per clock
cycle. Prasanna et al. [14] introduced spatial stacking for
multi-character matching, but the high fan-out of the automa-
ton significantly decreases its frequency, already for matching
8 bytes per clock cycle. Achieving the 100 Gbps throughput,
which requires more than 64 bytes to be processed at once,
is thus not possible. Becchi and Crowley [15] introduced
a multi-striding technique, which is widely used to increase
the throughput of many NFA-based RE matching architectures.
Multi-striding alone, however, cannot increase the processing
speed to 100 Gbps because with the length of the stride, the
NFA grows rapidly, and the frequency drops dramatically [8].
We build on our previous work [8] introducing parallel
pipelined automata, which can scale the throughput of NFA-
based RE matching to over 100 Gbps. The processing speed
is increased at the cost of a linear growth of hardware
resources because the architecture consists of many automata
connected in one processing pipeline. In a recent work, a novel
FPGA architecture that significantly improved the throughput
of DFA-based RE matching has been proposed by Yang et
al. [31]. The architecture achieves a throughput of 140 Gbps
on a single FPGA chip for IDS modules where the underlying
DFAs have up to 10k states (corresponding to 34 REs of
SNORT). Our new multi-stage architecture, which leverages
approximate NFAs, fundamentally improves the results of [8]
and [31]. We can achieve, on a similar chip, a throughput
beyond 200 Gbps for much more complicated sets of REs (e.g.,
SNORT’s spyware module with 461 REs where the under-
lying NFA has ∼10k states and the corresponding DFA is pro-
hibitively large—our attempt of its determinisation depleted
the available memory (32 GiB) after reaching 616k states).
The works closest to our NFA reduction techniques are [16]
and [17]. In [16], the authors address the issue of software-
based acceleration of matching REs describing network attacks
in SNORT. To reduce the number k of membership tests needed
for matching a packet against k distinct DFAs, [16] builds
a “search tree” with the k DFAs in its leaves and with the
inner nodes occupied by preferably small DFAs that over-
approximate the union of their children (the precise DFA
accepting the union is prohibitively large). Matching a packet
then means to propagate it down the tree as long as it belongs
to languages of the DFA nodes. The over-approximating DFAs
are constructed using a similar notion of significance of states
as in our approach. The differences from our work are the
following: (1) [16] needs several membership tests per packet,
(2) it targets only software and its hardware implementation
would be too complex, (3) it does not consider reduction of
NFAs, and (4) it uses only a pruning-based reduction (we also
employ merging and simulation-based reductions).
Our previous work in [17] also targets approximate reduc-
tions of NFAs used in HW-accelerated IDSes. In contrast to
the approach in this paper, which uses a sample of the network
traffic to determine the states to remove, [17] uses a probabilis-
tic model of the traffic in the form of a probabilistic automaton,
which is used to label states of the NFA by probabilities of
activation. The method has the following drawbacks: (1) the
model can be constructed from a sample of traffic only semi-
automatically, with an aid of a network expert, and (2) it scales
to NFAs of up to only around 1,300 states, whereas our NFAs
are sometimes an order of magnitude larger. Moreover, [17]
considers only a single-stage architecture.
Simulation-based reduction is a standard language-
preserving NFA reduction technique, which, apart from its
basic form [18] (used in [19] in the context of FPGA-
accelerated IDSes), comes in a number of advanced variants
(e.g. look-ahead, multi-pebble, or mediated [20]–[22]), many
of them implemented in the tool REDUCE [23]. Although
REDUCE is a part of our workflow, the power of simulation
reduction alone is by far insufficient for our purposes.
Finally, we compare our approach with RE-matching
techniques that use modern general-purpose GPUs. As
in FPGAs, we can distinguish architectures leveraging
both DFAs and NFAs. Prominent GPU architectures
based on DFAs include Gregex [28], hierarchical paral-
lel machines [29], and a recent work employing algo-
rithm/implementation co-optimization based on a GPU per-
formance model [30]. These architectures are able to per-
form RE matching at the theoretical throughput of 100–
150 Gbps. Their practical performance is, however, limited by
the packet transfer throughput (e.g., the throughput of [28]
was 25 Gbps on NVIDIA GTX260), and, indeed, the complex-
ity of RE modules they can handle due to determinization.
An RE matching architecture for GPUs based on NFAs
was proposed in iNFAnt [27] and further improved in [32].
In contrast to the aforementioned DFA-based solutions, this
architecture can handle complex RE modules where the un-
derlying NFAs have over 10 thousand states. The performance
of this work is, however, significantly inferior to our FPGA-
based architecture. For example, for a category of SNORT
modules where the underlying NFAs have 3–18 thousand
states, [32] reports an overall throughput of 1–2 Gbps on
NVIDIA Tesla c2050. Our experiments in Section IV show
that, on SNORT modules with similar sizes, our approach is
able to achieve a throughput of over 100 Gbps.
Further disadvantages of using GPUs are that (i) they are
notorious energy hogs, e.g., the NVIDIA Tesla K20c (used
by [30]) card’s TDP is 225 W, which is significantly higher
than the 75 W consumed by our FPGA-based architecture and
(ii) they impose a high latency on packet processing (in the
order of hundreds of ms compared to ∼10µs of our solution).
II. ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we first describe the basic architecture of
the RE matching engine from [8], which is used as a building
block of our multi-stage architecture described later.
A. Regular Expression Matching Engine
The architecture proposed in [8] uses pipelining to enable
RE matching in high-speed networks on a single FPGA. An
example of an instance of this architecture consisting of k = 3
pipelined FAs and a single packet buffer is shown in Fig. 1a.
(a)
A1
A1
A1
A1
A2
A2
A3
stage 1
stage 2
stage 3
(b)
Fig. 1. (a) The architecture of an RE matching engine with k = 3 pipelined
FAs sharing a single packet buffer able to store N -bit data words (columns),
each of which consists of k independent n-bit blocks (rows). (b) An example
of the multi-stage architecture with 3 stages.
The packet buffer stores every N -bits-wide input data word
as k independent data blocks of n bits (i.e., N = k · n). Each
of the k FAs can read data blocks on the corresponding row of
the buffer and also receives the configuration of the previous
FA in the pipeline that processed the previous block of the
packet (or the initial configuration if the FA is processing
the first block of a packet). Based on these inputs, the FA
either computes the next configuration or determines an RE
that matches the packet. These pieces of information are sent
to the next FA in the pipeline until the last block of the packet
is processed, in which case a bitmap encoding all matching
REs is output. As only one of the k pipelined FAs can perform
RE matching in a given packet at any moment, the whole
pipeline can theoretically perform RE matching in k packets
in parallel.
The FA that encodes the complete set of REs is replicated
k times. For instance, to achieve the throughput of 100 Gbps,
we used the replication factor k = 16 in [8]. Such a massive
replication costs a lot of FPGA resources, which becomes
the major bottleneck of the approach. On the other hand,
the replication is also a unique opportunity for optimizations
because every reduction of the FA’s size means a 16-times
higher reduction in the whole architecture. From this point of
view, using NFAs is preferable to DFAs because, especially
in the combination with language-preserving simulation-based
reduction, they are much more succinct than DFAs, and can
also be mapped into FPGAs more efficiently than DFAs.
They are, however, still prohibitively large in many practical
cases; this calls for better reduction methods. In Section III,
we present two such methods in the form of approximate
reductions, which do not preserve the language of the FA.
The reduced FAs are used within our multi-stage architecture
(built on top of the pipelined approach of [8]), which allows us
to flexibly adjust the tradeoff between precision and consumed
resources. The multi-stage architecture is described next.
B. Multi-Stage Regular Expression Matching Architecture
We now propose a concept of a multi-stage RE matching
unit that uses aggressive approximate reductions, which do
not preserve the language of the NFA, to utilise FPGA
resources efficiently. The architecture of the RE matching unit
is composed of several stages (see Fig. 1b for an example
of a 3-stage architecture). Every stage in the architecture
contains an instantiation of the RE matching engine described
in Section II-A.
The idea is that each of the stages will use different NFAs—
starting with a bigger number of smaller and imprecise NFAs
and proceeding to smaller numbers of larger but more precise
NFAs—to decrease, in a resource-efficient way, the number
of packets entering the subsequent stage. Consider an NFA A
that recognizes the language L defined by the REs in a given
SNORT module. The first stage of the architecture contains
many copies of a small NFA A1, which over-approximates L,
i.e., apart from all packets in L, it also matches some packets
not in L. All matched packets are then sent to Stage 2,
which contains less copies of a larger NFA A2, which over-
approximates L, but more precisely than A1 (which is the
reason it is larger—less precise approximations of L obtained
by our reduction are usually smaller than more precise ones).
The number of copies of A2 can be smaller due to the fact
that the traffic entering it is just a fraction of the input traffic
since Stage 1 has removed a significant number of packets
from further processing. Each subsequent stage contains an
even smaller number of even more precise (and, therefore,
larger) NFAs. The final stage contains either copies of A,
in which case the output of the RE matching unit is exactly
the packets from L, or as precise over-approximation of L as
possible given the available resources, in which case the last
remaining false positives need to be removed in software.
Our approximate reduction methods (described in detail
in Section III) output a Pareto frontier of NFAs A = {A1, . . . ,
Ak} obtained from the input NFA A. Each NFA Ai comes
with two parameters: (1) its size given as the number of look-
up tables (LUTs) obtained from its HW synthesis, denoted
by the function LUT : A → N, and (2) the probability
that it accepts an input packet, denoted by the function
Acc : A→ [0, 1]. Note that lower is better for both parameters.
Given the set A, we aim at obtaining a configuration of the
multi-stage architecture that is as small and precise as possible.
This gives rise to the following two optimisation problems:
• OPTRSC : minimise the amount of resources (denoted by
the variable 〈RSC〉) used by the RE matching unit given
a maximum speed of traffic on its output X and
• OPTout: minimise the speed of the traffic on the output
of the last n-th stage of the RE matching unit (denoted by
the variable 〈outn〉) given a fixed amount of resources Y .
The optimization problems can be formalised (and then
solved by a constraint solver) using the following constraints.
The first constraint formalises that, in an n-stage architec-
ture, the output of each stage (denoted using a real-valued
variable 〈outi〉) is the fraction of the unit’s input traffic 〈out0〉
given by the acceptance probability of the used NFA Aj (the
0/1 variable 〈iusesj〉 denotes that Stage i uses the NFA Aj):
∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : 〈outi〉 = 〈out0〉 ·
∑
Aj∈A
〈iusesj〉 ·Acc(Aj). (1)
TABLE I
(A) PARAMETERS OF THE NFAS. (B) POSSIBLE CONFIGURATIONS OF THE
MULTI-STAGE UNIT (OUTPUT OF EACH CONFIGURATION IS 10 GBPS).
LUT Acc
A1 100 0.5
A2 200 0.2
A3 1,000 0.1
(a)
# Stg. 1 Stg. 2 Stg. 3 LUTs
1 16×A3 — — 16,000
2 16×A2 4×A3 — 7,200
3 16×A1 8×A3 — 9,600
4 16×A1 8×A2 4×A3 7,200
(b)
The second family of constraints formalises that every stage
uses precisely one version of the NFA from A:
∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : 1 =
∑
Aj∈A
〈iusesj〉. (2)
Finally, the third constraint formalises the total re-
sources 〈RSC〉 used by the architecture:
〈RSC〉 =
∑
1≤i≤n
⌈ 〈outi−1〉
TP
⌉
·
∑
Aj∈A
〈iusesj〉 · LUT (Aj). (3)
We suppose that TP is the throughput of the NFAs (obtained
as the multiple of the NFA’s input bit-width and the clock
frequency). The total resources are then computed in such
a way that the i-th stage uses d〈outi−1〉/TPe NFAs Aj (since
it needs to be able to process all of the output traffic from the
previous stage), each taking LUT (Aj) LUTs.
The considered optimisation problems can then be for-
malised as follows:
OPTRSC : Minimise 〈RSC〉 subject to 〈outn〉 ≤ X,
OPTout : Minimise 〈outn〉 subject to 〈RSC〉 ≤ Y.
Here, X is the maximal permissible output traffic, and Y is
the maximal number of LUTs available in the architecture.
Example: Consider the scenario with 100 Gbps input deliv-
ered over a 512-bit interface on 200 MHz. Moreover, assume
that the data width of the NFAs is set to 32 bits, their
throughput is, therefore, 6.4 Gbps, so 16 of them are needed
to process the input 100 Gbps, and, further, assume that
there are 10,000 available LUTs. Suppose that we are given
a precise NFA A for which our reduction procedure—based
on a sample of network traffic—yields a set of approximated
NFAs A = {A1,A2,A3 = A} (i.e., A3 is the precise NFA A)
such that their parameters are as given in Table Ia. Ignoring
the (negligible) overhead of stage interconnection, the possible
configurations of the multi-stage unit are presented in Table Ib.
Note that Configuration 1 (which uses a single stage with no
approximation) cannot fit within the available resources. 
III. APPROXIMATE NFA REDUCTION
A nondeterministic finite automaton (NFA) over a finite
alphabet Σ is a quadruple A = (Q, δ, qI , F ) where Q is
a finite set of states, δ ⊆ Q× Σ×Q is a transition relation,
qI ∈ Q is the initial state, and F ⊆ Q is a set of final states.
For q ∈ Q and a ∈ Σ, we write δ(q, a) to denote the set
{q′ ∈ Q | (q, a, q′) ∈ δ}. It is lifted to sets S ⊆ Q as
q0 q1
q2
q3
q4
a
a
b
b
a q0 q1 q3
a
a
a q0 q1
a
Fig. 2. An example of pruning: the original NFA (left), after pruning (middle),
and after a subsequent simulation reduction (right).
δ(S, a) =
⋃
q∈S δ(q, a) and to words as δˆ(q, ε) = {q} and
δˆ(q, wa) = δ(δˆ(q, w), a) for w ∈ Σ∗.
Our hardware architecture uses NFAs to accept packets
based on their prefixes, and so we use a slightly non-standard
notion of the language of an NFA. Namely, the language of
a state q is the set of words LA(q) = {w1.w2 ∈ Σ∗ | ∃qf ∈
F : qf ∈ δˆ(q, w1)}, i.e., words whose prefix can take A from
q to some accepting state, followed by an arbitrary suffix. The
language of A is then defined as L(A) = LA(qI).
A. Pruning Reduction
Our first NFA reduction is the so-called pruning reduction.
The reduction removes from the automaton a set R of states
considered as insignificant, together with all their adjacent
transitions. At the same time, in order to overapproximate the
original language, all states that are not removed and that have
a transition going to a removed state are made final. Below,
we call such states border states, forming a set B.
More precisely, let A = (Q, δ, qI , F ) be an NFA over Σ,
and let R ⊆ Q, qI 6∈ R, be a set of states to be removed
(we will later discuss how to find such a set). Let B = {q ∈
Q \R | ∃a ∈ Σ : δ(q, a)∩R 6= ∅} be the set of border states
corresponding to R. The operation of pruning from A the
states from R produces the NFAAR = (Q′ = Q\R, δ′, qI , F ′)
where δ′ = δ ∩ (Q′ × Σ×Q′) and F ′ = (F ∩Q′) ∪B.
The pruning reduction over-approximates the original lan-
guage, i.e., L(A) ⊆ L(AR). The obtained NFA can, of
course, be potentially further reduced by exact, simulation-
based reductions [23]. An example of the pruning reduction
is shown in Fig. 2 assuming that R = {q2, q4} and hence
B = {q1}. Recall that the acceptance is based on accepting
prefixes.
The trade-off between reduction and accuracy that the
pruning reduction offers depends on the choice of the set R
of the states to be removed. We therefore try to compose R
from such states of A that have the least influence on the
acceptance/rejection of packets in typical traffic. For that, we
use a representative sample S of the network traffic in the
form of a multiset of packets. We label each state q ∈ Q
of the input NFA A by its significance: the number `(q)
of packets from S over which the state q can be reached
in A (if there are multiple ways of reaching q over the
same packet, we do not distinguish them). Formally, `(q) =∑
w∈{w1.w2∈S|q∈δˆ(qI ,w1)} S(w) where S(w) is the number of
occurrences of the packet w in the multiset S.
The error caused by the pruning reduction based on a set
of states R wrt a sample S can be bounded in terms of
significance of the border states B corresponding to R. Indeed,
only the packets accepted at some border state can get wrongly
Fig. 3. A heat map illustrating significance of states in a typical NFA.
accepted. Formally, errorac(S,A,AR) ≤
∑
q∈B `(q) where
errorac(S,A,AR) =
∑
w∈L(AR)\L(A) S(w) is the exact error
caused by the reduction on the sample S.
To specify the desired reduction, we use a target reduction
ratio θ ∈ (0, 1] meaning that the automaton should be reduced
to m = dθ · |Q|e states. To obtain m states while minimising
the error, we fill R with |Q| −m least significant states1.
Continuing with our example from Fig. 2, the reduction ratio
is θ = 0.6. To get the set R = {q2, q4}, the significance of the
states q2 and q4 must be smaller than that of q0, q1, and q3.
Intuitively, this means that seeing b after the initial a symbols
is rare. Hence, even if we allow the automaton to accept
a string with the initial a symbols followed by a b symbol
that is not followed by the second required b, no big error
will be caused. The fact that such scenarios are commmon for
NFAs obtained from real-world REs over real-world traffic is
illustrated by our successful experiments (Section IV).
As an additional illustration, Fig. 3 shows a heat map of
the states of an NFA obtained from one simplified RE (the
sprobe PCRE mentioned in Sect. IV), having a typical
stucture of many of the NFAs that one obtains from real-world
PCREs, which was labelled over a sample of real-world traffic.
The “cold” states (blue, green) have low significance and are
good candidates for pruning.
The significance of all states is computed efficiently in
time O(kn2) where n = |Q| and k = ∑w∈S |w| · S(w)
is the overall length of S. For that, we can use the subset
construction known from determinisation of NFAs, just run on
particular packets w ∈ S. Namely, each state’s significance
is initially set to zero. Then, we run A over every w =
a1 . . . al ∈ S , computing consecutive sets of states Qi that
are possibly reached after processing the prefix a1 . . . ai, and,
at the end of the run, we increment by one the significance of
each of the states encountered on the way. Formally, for each
w ∈ S, we start with Q0 = {qI}, and, subsequently, compute
Qi+1 = δ(Qi1, ai+1) for all 1 < i < l. The significance of all
states in the set
⋃l
i=0Q
i is then incremented by one.
B. Merging Reduction
Our second reduction, called a merging reduction, is mo-
tivated by an observation that, in typical traffic, packets that
start with a prefix of a certain kind (i.e., they are from some
1 This strategy can cause a larger error when an originally non-accepting
border state of a high significance is forced to become accepting by some
insignificant accepting successor state. This could be avoided, e.g., by prefer-
ring pruning final states without a significant successor border state. In our
experiments, we, however, sufficed with the simple strategy.
language L) almost always continue by an infix w that follows
a predetermined pattern (a concrete word or a sequence of
characters from predetermined character classes). We say that,
in a sample S, the pattern of w is predetermined by L. The part
of the automaton that, after reading the prefix from L, tests
whether the infix fits the pattern can be significantly simplified
by collapsing it into a single state with a self-loop over all
the symbols that label the original transitions while causing
a small error only: Indeed, it is unlikely that a packet with
an infix other than the predetermined one will appear after
the given prefix. Note that the pruning reduction discussed
previously is not suitable for simplifying the states that test
the pattern as they may be of an arbitrarily high significance.
The operation of merging a sub-automaton based on a set S
of states means to (1) redirect the targets of transitions enter-
ing S to a new state s, (2) reconnect all transitions leaving S to
start from s instead, (3) make s final iff any of the states in S
is final, and (4) remove the states of S. Note that, like pruning,
merging also over-approximates the language by allowing any
permutation of the infix pattern.
Our detection of the parts of automata to be merged—
typically, sequences of states—is based on a notion of dis-
tance defined for a pair of states q and r as dist(q, r) =
max
(
`(r)
`(q) ,
`(q)
`(r)
)
if they are neighbours (i.e., r ∈ δ(q, a) or
q ∈ δ(r, a) for some a) and as dist(q, r) = ∞ otherwise.
Intuitively, a small dist(q, r) means that `(q) and `(r) are sim-
ilar, which typically happens if most of the packets reaching q
continue to r or vice versa.2 Symbols on transitions from q to
r hence form a predetermined pattern of length 1. Therefore,
merging q and r, and thus over-approximating the pattern,
should cause a small error only. Merging of longer patterns is
then achieved by merging multiple patterns of length 1.
The merging reduction is parameterised by a distance ceil-
ing D—we merge states with distance below D. Formally,
the sets of states to be merged are defined as the equivalence
classes of the smallest equivalence ∼D ⊆ Q×Q that contains
all pairs (q, r) with dist(q, r) ≤ D (in other words, ∼D is the
reflexive transitive closure of {(q, r) | dist(q, r) ≤ D}).
The merging reduction does not provide theoretical guaran-
tees, and it is to a large degree based on empirical experience,
in which its parametrisation with D allows one to control the
ratio between reduction and error well. There are, however,
cases in which merging leads to an undesirable loss of preci-
sion even with a small D. To limit such effects, we restrict
merging by an additional parameter, the frequency ceiling F ∈
(0, 1]. We prohibit merging of states with freq(q) = `(q)|S| > F ,
that is, those whose frequency in S is larger than the ceiling.
Formally, given D and F , we merge the equivalence classes
of ∼D ∩ {(q, r) | freq(q) ≤ F ∧ freq(r) ≤ F}.
An example of the merging reduction is shown in Fig. 4,
assuming dist(q2, q3) < D, dist(q3, q4) < D, and that all
other distances are greater than D. To make the states q2, q3,
2In theory, it does not have to be the case, as dist(q, r) may be polluted
by packets reaching and leaving q and r from and to other states, but it is
mostly the case in practice.
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Fig. 4. An input NFA (left) and an NFA obtained by merging (right).
TABLE II
SIZES OF THE CONSIDERED NFAS.
NFA States Transitions
backdoor 3,898 100,301
l7-all 7,280 2,647,620
pop3 923 209,467
sprobe 168 5,108
spyware 12,809 279,334
and q4 less critical, we further assume that freq(q2) < F ,
freq(q3) < F , freq(q4) < F . Intuitively, this means that
only some packets continue over b from q0 to q2. Roughly
all of those packets then continue until they reach q4, where
another important split of the acceptance happens. The prefix
b, however, predetermines the subsequent occurrence of cd.
By simplifying the automaton and allowing any string from
{c, d}∗ to appear after b, no significant error arises since most
packets will anyway contain cd after b only.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we present an experimental evaluation of the
proposed approach on real RE-matching instances.
A. Considered REs
We experimented with a set of REs describing protocols and
attacks obtained from the L7 classifier for the Linux Netfilter
[24] framework and from the SNORT tool [1]. From the L7
classifier describing L7 protocols, we used all rules, giving us a
set of REs denoted as l7-all below. From the SNORT tool,
we used the following set of REs: backdoor, pop3, and
spyware-put (abbreviated as spyware below), describing
attacks on selected protocols. We also used nine rules, denoted
as sprobe, proposed for lawful interception in cooperation
with our national police. We used the NETBENCH tool [25] for
(i) translating REs to NFAs and (ii) the synthesis of reduced
NFAs to VHDL. The sizes of the NFAs obtained by translating
the considered REs are shown in Table II.
B. Evaluation Data
The sample of network traffic that we used for our exper-
iments was obtained from two measuring points of a nation-
wide Internet provider connected to a 100 Gbps backbone link.
The training data used for labelling the automata contained
∼1M packets sampled from the captured traffic during the
time of 19.5 min containing 509M packets. The testing data
used for the subsequent evaluation consisted of ∼21M packets
sampled from the captured traffic containing ∼210M packets.
The testing data was sampled over the time of 105 hours (over
4 days) such that every hour 1M packets were captured.
C. Evaluation Environment
We implemented the proposed techniques in a Python
prototype [33]. In the experiments, we ran merging with the
frequency ceiling F = 0.1 and the distance ceiling D = 1.005.
FPGA synthesis was done using Xilinx Vivado v.2018.1.
D. Running Time
Our reduction techniques are light-weight, and, in contrast
to existing approaches [17], they are capable of reducing
large NFAs appearing in real-world RE matching problems
for real network scenarios. (Recall that the largest automata
we consider have over 12k states or over 2.5M transitions.)
Using the training data containing 1M packets, we needed
about 15 min to derive the state labelling function ` for the
largest considered NFAs. The runtime of the other parts of
the reduction process was then negligible. Also note that, for
a given NFA, the labelling can be performed only once for
various values of the reduction ratio θ.
E. Research Questions
We are interested in the following two key research ques-
tions related to the proposed approach:
R1: Are our reduction techniques able to provide useful trade-
offs between the reduction error and the reduction ratio?
R2: Can the reduced NFAs be compiled into a multi-stage
architecture with throughput of 100 Gbps and beyond?
R1: Reduction Trade-offs
In our experiments with the reduction techniques, we con-
sider both the pruning and merging reductions. The merging
reduction is, however, always combined with a subsequent
pruning reduction as a standalone use of merging turned out
not to be effective. Moreover, as a baseline, we also consider
a so-called bfs-reduction. It does not use any training traffic
and works by simply pruning away states that are far from the
initial state. All of the approximate reductions are followed
by the exact simulation-based reduction [20] whenever the
tool REDUCE [23] implementing this reduction is capable of
handling the approximate NFA (it fails on large NFAs).
We consider two metrics characterizing the reduced au-
tomata. The first metric is the acceptance precision AP =
ATP
AFP+ATP
where ATP denotes acceptance true positives (the
packet is accepted and should have been accepted) and AFP
denotes acceptance false positives (the packet is accepted and
should not have been accepted). This metric expresses the ratio
of correctly accepted packets to all accepted packets from the
testing traffic sample and hence characterizes the error caused
by the approximation. Our second metric is the acceptance
probability Prob = ATP+AFP|S| (where |S| denotes the size of
the input network traffic sample) that captures what fraction
of the input traffic is accepted by the reduced NFA and passed
to the next stage, i.e., how much the NFA reduces the flow of
packets to be further processed. Prob is an important metric
for building efficient multi-stage architectures.
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Fig. 5. Results for l7-all and backdoor.
Figs. 5 and 6 show the trade-offs achieved by our different
reduction strategies (namely, bfs, prune, and merge-prune) on
challenging RE matching problems.
Figs. 5a and 5b show results for the NFA describing
l7-all. We observe that the particular reduction techniques
provide a different quality of the trade-offs. In particular, bfs
is not capable of producing any useful approximation. Further,
we can observe that merge-prune dominates for reduction
ratios lower than 0.3, but it is significantly outperformed by
prune for higher ratios.
The figures show that these trends are preserved for both
metrics. Note that the original NFA accepts around 17 % of
the traffic, and using the prune technique, we obtain a reduced
NFA having only a half of the states with almost the same
acceptance probability Prob.
The reduction trade-offs that we obtain for the NFA of the
backdoor attack are plotted in Figs. 5c and 5d. The bfs
reduction is again significantly outperformed by both the prune
and merge-prune methods when AP is considered. Note that
these two techniques provide reductions that achieve almost a
100 % AP using only 35 % of the states of the original NFA.
As the NFA accepts only 0.2 % of the traffic, we can obtain the
accepting probability Prob that is close to this value using only
22 % of its states regardless of the reduction used. We observed
similar trends also for the pop3 and sprobe attacks (not
presented here due to lack of space) where almost a 0 % Prob
was achieved using only 20 % and 25 % states, respectively.
Finally, we report the results for spyware REs in Fig. 6.
We can see that, wrt AP , prune lags behind the other two
techniques for reduction ratios between 0.15 and 0.35. For
higher reductions, all techniques provide AP close to 100 %.
Similar trends can be observed also for the Prob metric (not
presented here). Note that the original NFA accepts about
3.5 % of the input traffic only.
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Fig. 6. AP for spyware.
The experiments conducted within R1 clearly demonstrate
that the proposed reduction techniques are able to provide
high-quality trade-offs between the precision and the reduction
factors. They also show that our techniques can considerably
outperform the baseline bfs-reduction and can handle very
complex NFAs (having more than 10k states), where existing
methods (such as those in [17] and [23]) fail.
R2: Compiling the Multi-Stage Architecture
We will use the reduced NFAs from R1 to obtain in-
stantiations of the multi-stage architecture that can be used
in FPGA-based IDSes to effectively decrease the amount of
traffic that the software part of the IDS needs to process.
We synthesise our designs for a card with the Xilinx Virtex
UltraScale+ VU9P FPGA chip, which contains 1,182k LUTs
(other resources are in our case always dominated by the
number of LUTs). From our experience, it is possible to use up
to 70 % of the LUTs available on the FPGA and successfully
route designs at the considered frequency (200 MHz), which
leaves us with 827k LUTs that we can use. Moreover, the
components that we use for receiving packets and transfering
them to the CPU consume around 90k LUTs, we are therefore
left with 737k LUTs for RE matching.
In every stage of the RE matching unit, we use the pipelined
NFAs architecture described in Section II-A instantiated with
8-bit data-width of the NFAs, which gave us the best results.
Therefore, the throughput (parameter TP in Section II-B) of
every NFA at 200 MHz is 1.6 Gbps. The optimisation problem
of compiling the multi-stage architecture leads to a mixed
integer quadratically constrained quadratic program, which we
solve using the Gurobi solver [26] (this step took at most 2 s).
Our goal is to obtain single-box IDSes using a combination
of hardware preprocessing and a software IDS. This means that
the task of the hardware accelerator is to decrease the amount
of the traffic entering the software part as much as possible
while keeping all suspicious packets. Ideally, the final stage
of the RE matching unit would be the precise NFA, so the
hardware accelerator would output precisely the packets that
match the given set of REs. Due to the size of the precise
NFAs, this is, however, often infeasible, so we also consider
the setting that decreases the traffic as much as possible.
Below, we provide results of our experiments for some of
the considered sets of REs. We tried to compile architectures
for the speeds 100, 200, and 400 Gbps using 1–4 stages.
1) backdoor: In Table III, we present results of optimal
architectures for the SNORT’s backdoor module. We present
TABLE III
OPTIMAL MULTISTAGE ARCHITECTURE FOR THE BACKDOOR MODULE.
Precise
speed 1 stg 2 stg 3 stg 4 stg
100 236k 56k 50k 50k
200 473k 113k 99k 96k
400 946k 223k 194k 186k
TABLE IV
OPTIMAL MULTISTAGE ARCHITECTURE FOR THE SPYWARE MODULE.
Precise 4 % of traffic
speed 1 stg 2 stg 3 stg 4 stg 1 stg 2 stg 3 stg 4 stg
100 5M 444k 296k 296k 227k 61k 65k 69k
200 10M 809k 513k 513k 453k 122k 126k 133k
400 20M 1.5M 945k 945k 907k 242k 247k 261k
only results for the precise setting, as our multi-stage architec-
tures can handle 400 Gbps traffic using the available resources
(737k LUTs). Note that the single stage architecture (i.e.,
the “1 stg” column), can process traffic up to 200 Gbps only
(the precise NFA consumes 3,695 LUTs). In order to process
400 Gbps, it is necessary to use the multi-stage architecture,
in which case four stages give the best results.
2) spyware: Our results for the SNORT’s spyware
module are shown in Table IV. This module is much
more complex than backdoor, since its precise
NFA takes ∼78k LUTs. Therefore, for the throughputs of
100 Gbps and 200 Gbps, the multi-stage architecture is
needed. For 400 Gbps, we were not able to obtain a precise
configuration; we were, however, able to obtain multi-
stage configurations (the best one with 2 stages) that
decrease the amount of traffic sent to the CPU below
4 % (i.e., 16 Gbps). Although 16 Gbps is on the edge of
capabilities of current SW-based IDSes, we stress that the
final-stage reduced NFA has AP very close to 100 % (Fig. 6)
and thus only a small fraction of packets are misclassified.
3) l7-all: Our most challenging example is from the
l7-all RE set. Although the size of the precise automaton
is not as large as for spyware (the precise NFA consumes
27,650 LUTs), it is less amenable for approximate reduction
because, in contrast to SNORT modules, it contains REs that
are matched by many packets. The results for the l7-all RE
set are shown in Table V. Our best solution reduces the input
traffic from 100 Gbps to 17 Gbps and uses 597 kLUTs in two
stages. As in the previous case, the final-stage reduced NFA
has almost 100 % precision and thus only a small fraction of
packets are misclassified.
4) sprobe and pop3: The sets of REs for sprobe and
pop3 are, on the other hand, quite less challenging. The
precise NFAs consume only 195 and 1,721 LUTs, respectively,
so we can easily obtain a precise design at 400 Gbps with only
a single stage using ∼50k and ∼440k LUTs, respectively.
The experiments conducted within R2 clearly demonstrate
the practical potential of our approach. The key observation is
that the resource reductions provided by the particular multi-
stage architectures directly depend on the characteristics of
the underlying NFAs (both the precise NFA and the reduced
variants) and the typical traffic. Apart from the size of the
TABLE V
OPTIMAL MULTISTAGE ARCHITECTURE FOR THE L7-ALL MODULE.
Precise 17 % of traffic
speed 1 stg 2 stg 3 stg 4 stg 1 stg 2 stg 3 stg 4 stg
100 1.8M 894k 880k 880k 1.1M 597k 648k 701k
precise NFA, there are two crucial characteristics: (1) whether
the number of packets accepted by the precise NFA is low
and (2) whether the reduction can compress the NFA while
not increasing the number of accepted packets too much.
If both these conditions are met (as for backdoor and
spyware), we observe drastic resource savings allowing us
to achieve throughput of the resulting IDSes going beyond
100 Gbps, which is unprecedented for REs of such size and
complexity. On the other hand, if the original NFA is large,
accepts many packets, and highly precise reductions achieve
only moderate reductions (as for l7-all), the resulting multi-
stage architecture provides only moderate savings and ensuring
100 Gbps remains at the edge of what we can achieve.
V. CONCLUSION
We have leveraged techniques for approximate reduction
of NFAs to allow RE matching of a set of SNORT/Netfilter
modules on speeds significantly beyond the capabilities of
the state-of-the-art single-box solutions, namely 100 and even
400 Gbps. The use of the approximate reduction allowed us
to significantly decrease the size of the NFAs while keeping
the number of false positives low (e.g. for SNORT’s spyware
module, we obtained a reduction to 28 % of the original size
while keeping the error below 2 %). Moreover, the use of
the multi-stage architecture better utilises FPGA resources
(e.g., using 3 stages, we were able to reduce the resources
consumed by spyware down to ∼5 % of the original without
introducing any error). As far as we know, our technique is
the first solution that can be used to obtain single-box IDSes
detecting large sets of complex REs at speeds over 100 Gbps.
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